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Abstract The outcome of the first electricity distribution price control review
in The Netherlands did not deliver the savings initially suggested by the regula-
tor (DTe). During the course of the first 3-year regulatory period, DTe revised
the X-Factors four times. The impact on tariffs has been substantial. DTe ini-
tially announced in 2000 that savings would be equivalent to 25% of electric
distribution revenues (e2bn). However, final X-Factors in May 2003 resulted
in savings of 10% of revenues. The total cost to consumers—when compared
to the most probable outcome—has been e140mln (7% of total revenues).
Keywords Regulation · Benchmarking · Consumer welfare · Regulatory
process · X-Factor
JEL Classifications D42 · D60 · K2 · L5
1 Introduction
The price control review has become a key element of independent economic
regulation of network utilities around the world in recent years. Once every
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3–5 years the regulatory agency responsible for setting prices for monopoly
network companies in telecoms, electricity, gas, water, railways or airports delib-
erates on what the maximum prices for these services should be, and sets them
for the upcoming control period.
Many countries around the world now have electricity price control reviews
in the wake of privatization and deregulation of electricity generation and
the gradual opening up to competition of final markets for electricity sup-
ply (or retail). Jamasb & Pollitt (2001), in a survey of 23 OECD and lead-
ing developing countries, found that 13 countries had price control periods of
3–5 years. The approach contrasts sharply with the previous regime under pub-
lic ownership where there was an annual determination of prices, investment
programmes, and other objectives, by the relevant government ministry follow-
ing a more or less formal process of internal consultation between the ministry
and the companies it regulated. In the US, Sappington, Pfeifenberger, Hanser,
and Basheda (2001) found that at least 16 out of 50 US states had introduced
some form of multiyear price control (often amounting to a nominal rate freeze
for domestic customers) as opposed to the traditional third party initiated rate
review. Multi-year price-caps in the US differ from those in other countries
in that they are voluntary agreements between firms and regulators and lack
statutory backing.
The Netherlands adopted a price control review approach to economic regu-
lation of its electricity distribution and transmission network companies in 1998
with the Electricity Act.1 Originally the first price control period was to be from
1 January 2001 to 31 December 2003. The first consultation document for this
price control review period was published in July 1999 (DTe, 1999). However,
the process went badly wrong. The Dutch energy regulator (DTe) revised the
X-Factors four times during a period of 3 years; these X-Factors fluctuated
substantially. Two major court cases before the industrial tribunal (CBb) were
lost by the DTe regarding the interpretation of the Electricity Act. The Final
X-Factors (and the customer savings) were significantly lower than the initial
proposals.
The cost to consumers of this failure to implement price controls as origi-
nally envisaged has been substantial. In this paper we present an analysis that
attempts to quantify the costs of this regulatory failure. DTe initially announced
in 2000 savings of approximately e511mln for customers (25% of annual
distribution revenue). However, mistakes in the data, methodology and timeta-
ble pressure revealed that this figure was an overestimation. The possible sav-
ings calculated in 2002, using actual audited and corrected data, were e384mln
(19% of annual distribution revenue). When DTe finally set the X-Factors for
the first regulatory period in May 2003, the mistakes from the past meant it
could only reduce revenues by e209mln (10% of revenue). Therefore, as a
result of this regulatory failure Dutch electricity distribution customers have
1 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2003a), Wet van 2 juli 1998, houdende regels met betrekking tot
de productie, het transport en de levering van elektriciteit (Elektriciteitswet 1998) (Stb. 2003, 235),
The Hague.
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paid e175mln more in tariffs than would have been possible over a 3-year
period.
In what follows we seek to document the course of the price review for the
period 2001–2003. We provide an analysis of the effects of different stages of
the review on customer bills and the consequences for consumer welfare. We
conclude by discussing what can be learned from this episode by regulators and
legislators around the world.
2 Benchmarking and incentive regulation
Outside the US, incentive-based regulation is synonymous with RPI-X
(or CPI-X) regulation, as first suggested by Littlechild (1983). Such price cap
regulation usually allows average prices (or revenue) to rise by the rate of infla-
tion minus an efficiency factor (X), which reflects the potential for relative pro-
ductivity improvement in the regulated firm. Under both Performance-based
Ratemaking (PBR) and RPI-X companies retain extra profits made under the
control formula.2 Price-cap regulation decouples profits from costs by setting
maximum prices for the duration of a specific period (or regulatory lag).
An important feature of incentive regulation is the use of benchmarking,
which can be broadly defined as the comparison of a firm’s actual performance
against some pre-defined reference or benchmark performance. A perceived
advantage of benchmarking has been that it reduces the information asym-
metry problem that occurs in rate of return (ROR) regulation by reducing
the regulator’s reliance on the firm’s own costs, but references the price to an
external non-influencable benchmark.
The most contentious issue in price-cap regulation is the basis for deter-
mining efficiency improvements and the translation of these into tariff changes
(X-Factors). Regulators have adopted a variety of benchmarkingmethods to ar-
rive at X-Factors. The main approaches can be divided into three broad types:
(i) pre-reform approaches where the focus is on historically observed costs
(US ROR regulation), (ii) conjectures about firm-specific efficiency (CPI-X) as
undertaken by European and Australian electricity regulators, and (iii) indus-
try-wide (or wider economy) productivity indices that some reform-oriented
Public Utility Commissions (PUC) in the United States are using.3 The
European regulators have generally adopted firm-specific conjecture-based
benchmarking methods as the basis on which to calculate the X-Factors. The
PUCs that have adopted PBR have tended to use either historically observed
costs (ROR) or industry wide productivity measures such as Total Factor Pro-
ductivity (TFP) to calculate the efficiency requirements (see Jamasb & Pollitt,
2001).
2 For the purposes of this study, unless specified, we do not differentiate between a price and a
revenue cap regulation based on the CPI-X formula.
3 See also Jamasb & Pollitt (2001) and Pollitt (1995), Coelli, Rap, and Battese (1998) and DTe
(1999).
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3 Electricity and regulation in The Netherlands
The Dutch electricity and gas distribution sector is predominantly in public
ownership (the exception being two small gas companies owned by Germany’s
RWE). Following a wave of consolidation during the 1990s, there are now three
large vertically integrated energy distribution companies, with a combinedmar-
ket share of 91%. Nuon and Essent are roughly equal with market shares of
33% (both also have generation assets4), and Eneco has around 25% market
share following its purchase on the fourth-largest energy company REMU in
December 2002. There are approximately 7.3 million customers in The Nether-
lands. Distribution is vertically separated, from high voltage transmission, with
the state-owned company TenneT being responsible for the national transmis-
sion system. For the purposes of this paper we focus on these three companies
when discussing the events of the first regulatory period. Figure 1 shows the
areas where Nuon, Essent, and Eneco currently operate.
4 The process
The liberalisation of the Dutch energy sector follows the long and drawn-out
process of agreeing the EU Electricity Directive and EU Gas Directive in the
middle of 1996 and middle of 1998, respectively.5 The Directive for electricity
was implemented in The Netherlands with the enactment of the Electricity Act
1998 (or E-Act).6 The discussion below draws heavily on the detailed summary
of events from a more legal perspective by Janssen & Pigmans (2004).
The E-Act set-up a regulator and required the integrated energy companies
to split their tariffs into a retail and network component. This split was to take
effect in 2000 and was to be based on the integrated tariffs of the companies
in 1996. The network tariffs were differentiated between the various voltage
levels using the “cascade” principle, where consumers pay for all the voltage
levels they use. Thus, a residential customer pays for the low voltage grid and
part of mid and higher voltage grids, whereas a high voltage customer only pays
for the high voltage grid.
TheE-Act also requires the regulator to set X-Factors for the companies. The
X-Factors are set for a regulatory period, which can vary between 3 and 5 years.
4 Nuon recently completed the purchase of Reliant’s UNA assets in December 2003.
5 Directives nr. 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC. In the summer of 2003 two newDirectives nr. 2003/54/EC
and 2003/55/EC were agreed that altered the original Guidelines and were meant to be imple-
mented before July 2004. Under these Directives all business customers should be free to choose
their supplier from 1 July 2004 and all residential customers from 1 July 2007. It also requires
legal unbundling for transmission by 1 July 2004 and by 1 July 2007 for distribution. It foresees
regulated Third Party Access and requires each country to establish a regulator (Germany has
been the exception in the EU—but has recently established a regulatory authority responsible for
energy—BundesNetzagentur).
6 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2003a), Wet van 2 juli 1998, houdende regels met betrekking tot
de productie, het transport en de levering van elektriciteit (Elektriciteitswet 1998) (Stb. 2003, 235),
The Hague.




Fig. 1 The areas where Nuon, Essent, and Eneco currently operate. Source: EnergieNed
The formula for adjusting the tariffs is CPI-X (similar to RPI-X). The compa-
nies are allowed to adjust their tariffs by CPI, whilst simultaneously adjusting
their tariffs with the X-Factor.
On 1 August 1998 the Dienst uitvoering en Toezicht energie (DTe) was set
up and became a separate chamber of the Dutch competition authority (the
NMa). In July 1999 the DTe published its first consultation document Price Cap
Regulation in the Electricity Sector.7 The procedure followed by the DTe—and
required by law—allowed companies to provide input into the consultation doc-
ument, after which the DTe published its methodology and subsequently the
X-Factor decisions. Relevant parties could then appeal against these decisions
to the NMa. If after this appeal, companies were still not satisfied with the out-
come they could appeal to a special tribunal for business (College van Beroep
voor het bedrijfsleven, CBb). A similar process—including X-Factors—was set
up for the supply tariffs of the retail companies, as household customers and
small businesses were not yet free to choose their supplier.
As well as specifying that the first regulatory period would be for three
calendar years (2001–2003) the 1999 consultation document further stated that
“It is the DTe’s remit to formulate sensible rules and incentives aimed
at enabling the latter category of actors [network operators] to perform
fairly, safely and with maximum efficiency as well as monitor the proper
implementation of regulations and ascertain whether the incentives are
having the appropriate effect.” (DTe, 1999, p. 4)
7 DTe (1999), Price Cap Regulation in the Electricity Sector, Information and Consultation Doc-
ument, July 1999, The Hague.
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In the 1999 consultation document the DTe sets out its basic principles
(i) Tariffs in 2000 should be based on the tariffs in 1996 (adjusted for volume
growth)—also known as the 1996 = 2000 basis;
(ii) Output steering (light-handed regulation) and the use of comparative
benchmarking—where DTe stated that “the principle of using different
methodologies to cross-check each other…” was to be applied;8 and
(iii) Regulation to be developed within the context of an internationalisation
of the energy sector and the (possible) privatisation of municipal-owned
companies.
However, when the Guidelines for Price Cap Regulation of the Dutch
Electricity Sector9 were published in February 2000, it became clear that the
DTe had opted to only use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)—a non-
parametric linear programming technique—arguing that this technique was
the most appropriate given the small sample size and that it was based on actual
results, unlike parametric approaches that involved estimations.10 In the 1999
consultation document, DTe had discussed parametric techniques, such as Cor-
rectedOrdinaryLeast Squares (COLS) andStochastic FrontierAnalysis (SFA).
The DTe stated that it would use a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) DEA
model arguing that companies were in control of the optimal scale by being able
to merge or de-merge. TheDEAmodel had total standardised cost (as opposed
to DTe’s initial intentions of using only operating costs) as the only input factor
and number of customers (small and large), kWh transmitted, number of trans-
formers, maximum simultaneous demand (distribution and transmission), and
network length as output factors. Total standardised costs consist of a depreci-
ation allowance and a return on the Regulated Asset Base (RAB).
The DTe also stated that
“…, it is important to stress that DTe is not proposing to adopt amechanis-
tic approach to the determination of X-Factors for the companies, based
solely on efficiency scores from a benchmarking exercise.”(DTe, 2000c,
p. 4)
5 Setting the X-Factor
In order to set the X-Factor, DTe undertook three steps. First, the starting
point for the regulatory period was the actual revenue in 2000. Because of the
1996 = 2000 principle DTe had a good estimate of the 2000 revenues—although
these would only become available later. In order to compare and benchmark
the different operators, DTe calculated standardised revenue. This standardised
revenue consisted of actual operating andmaintenance expenditure (in the first
8 DTe (1999), op. cit., p. 24.
9 DTe (2002b), Guidelines for Price Cap Regulation of the Dutch Electricity Sector, February
2000, The Hague.
10 See Coelli, Rap, and Battese (1998) for an introduction to efficiency and productivity analyses.
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X-Factor round forecasts were used), a depreciation allowance based on the
RAB, and a rate of return using a regulatory weighted average cost of capital.
This standardised revenue was then benchmarked against the set of outputs
described earlier. The relative efficiency scores from the benchmarking were
applied to the standardised revenue to determine the efficient revenue level
for each operator. The annual X-Factor was then calculated as the difference
between actual revenue in 2000 and the target efficient standardised revenue
at the end of the regulatory period evenly spread out over the 3-year period.
In order to compare the outcomes of the various X-Factors we calculate the
cumulative change in allowed revenues—discounted by the regulated return
(6.6%)—for the 3-year period. These savings are compared to the actual 2000
revenue of the companies. This allows an easy comparison of the impact of the
various X-Factors. The actual X-Factors—as published—by DTe cannot easily
be compared because they refer to different revenue bases. As the components
that made up the “revenue base” in the benchmarking changed, the subsequent
published X-Factors change. For example, certain costs were considered uncon-
trollable and therefore excluded from the revenue base. This has an artifical
impact on the published X-Factors. By re-scaling everything back to the start-
ing revenue we can compare the total revenue reductions. At each stage of the
process we report the actual X-Factors—as published by DTe—and the effec-
tive cumulative X-Factor based on the revenue reduction over the 2000 starting
revenue. Because Nuon, Essent, and Eneco consist of many smaller network
operators we also re-calculate the effective X-Factor for the groups as a whole.
In Table 1 we report: the company (column 1), the number of customers
(column 2), and the actual starting revenue in 2000 (column 3). The starting
revenue in 2000 is not known for the subsidiaries of Eneco, Essent, andNuon. In
order to examine the impact of cost reductions on the subsidiary companies we
calculate a proxy for the starting revenue (column 3) by taking the ratio of the
revenue base used by DTe for the calculations (column 4) to the total revenue
base and multiplying this by the actual starting revenue in 2000 for the group
(these figures are denoted in italic and bold). The X-Factors as reported by
DTe are reported in column 5. The cumulative discounted revenue reduction
per company is reported in column 6 and calculated by taking the absolute
difference in revenue reductions as reported by DTe. The revenue reduction is
discounted using the DTe’s weighted average cost of capital—6.6%. The cumu-
lative savings per customer are reported in column 7. The percentages reported
in column 8 compare the total revenue reduction (column 6) to the starting
revenue in 2000 (column 3).
5.1 X-Factor 2000: the initial errors
Table 1 reports the results from the first X-Factor set in September 2000 by
DTe (and to be implemented from 2001). The table shows substantial revenue
reductions for all the companies, with the exception of Delta and one of the
Essent companies (Essent Brabant). Nuon consists of three subsidiaries but
was counted as one company in the 2000 X-Factors. Total cumulative revenue













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regulatory process and consumer welfare 269
reductions for the sector weree511mln ore70 per customer. This is equivalent
to 25% of revenue in 2000 ofe2 bn.11 Delta’s customers face a tariff increase of
e27 per customer, whereas EnecoDelfland customers receive a tariff reduction
of e150. Remarkable is the stark difference between the X-Factors for Essent,
Nuon and Eneco. Whereas Eneco and Nuon both faced substantial reductions
in their revenues (42 and 41%, respectively), Essent only faced a minor reduc-
tion in revenues (3.5%). The fact that Essent Brabant (largest by revenue of
the Essent Group) received an X-Factor of−1.3% pulls down the total revenue
reductions required for the Essent group.
There was substantial criticism of the DTe’s results and most companies
(except notably Essent) subsequently appealed to the NMa.12 The appeal to
the NMa is the intermediary step before appealing to the special tribunal for
business—the CBb. During the NMa appeal process the 2000 X-Factors were
implemented by the companies. Part of the appeal procedure was a natural
reaction by the companies to the fact that this was the first distribution price
control review. Given the fact that there was no prior jurisprudence regard-
ing the distribution price control review, most parties felt that testing the legal
boundaries of the DTe was necessary. The appeal procedure was also a way to
ensure that the companies remained a stakeholder in the process.
The content of these appeals focused predominantly on the allegation that
DTe did not cross-check the relative efficiency scores from the benchmark-
ing for consistency, as it had earlier stated in the consultation document. The
benchmarking—according to the companies—did not fairly reflect the relative
positions of the companies. As part of their critique, companies submitted alter-
native efficiency analyses that demonstrated different positions. The comments
focused on both model specification (see Nillesen & Telling, 2001) and bench-
marking methodology. The analysis by Nillesen & Telling (2001) using the same
data but a different model specification (network length as input instead of as
output) resulted in completely different results.
Exactly a year later (September 2001) theNMa announced its decision on the
appeal (2001 X-Factors). In this decision the NMa discussed the issues raised
by the companies and in the same document set out a revised approach (as DTe
executed and was closely involved in assessing the appeal, we refer to DTe).
Firstly, as a result of the appeal procedure theDTe adopted a different approach
to calculating the value of regulated assets. Initially, the DTe had discounted
the regulated profits to calculate the RAB.13 This method was now replaced by
11 In the DTe’s press release announcing the X-Factors (26 September 2000) it refers to an
average X-Factor of 5.9% for the sector, which results in a total revenue reduction of e590mln.
However, it subsequently had to make some adjustments as it erroneously forgot some data from
the smaller companies. In addition, the DTe did not discount the cumulative savings, therefore the
final discounted savings are e511mln.
12 See for example, KPMG BEA (2000), Nillesen & Telling (2001), and NYFER (2001).
13 As tariffs were fixed at the 1996 = 2000 level, all that was required to calculate the RAB was
to subtract operational expenditures and depreciation charges. The remainder were the regulated
profits, which when discounted by the DTe’s weighted average cost of capital would give the RAB
value.
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using the companies’ actual historical investments and depreciating these using
standardised depreciation schedules. Secondly, DTe updated the benchmark-
ing data set by removing certain mistakes and data errors. NMa claimed that
the model specification was methodologically superior and that Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA) was the only appropriate benchmarking technique
given the limited sample size. Importantly, DTe applied the legal principle of
no “reformatio in peius”, stating that
“By virtue of section 7:11, clause 1, of the General Administrative Law
Act, the director of the DTe is also of the opinion that the party lodging a
notice of objection must not, as a result, be put in a worse position than if
he had not made an objection (principle that ‘reformatio in peius’ is for-
bidden). Therefore for a grid operator no more unfavourable X must be
set than had been set in relation to the primary decision, even if this stems
from application of the amended regulatory methodology.” DTe (2001)
p. 36/37
“Furthermore, in the opinion of the director of the DTe the relevant prin-
ciple (no ‘reformatio in peius’) applies only with respect to the X-factor
as the end result of applying the regulatory method, not with respect to
any interim result on the basis of a step in the method (in that case more
favourable interim results for a grid operator may be passed on, but not
more unfavourable ones). In the final analysis, when the decision is made
on the objection a grid operator must not be put in a worse position than
if the grid operator had not made an objection.” DTe (2001) p. 36/37
The text suggests DTe was forced to implement this principle, referring to sec-
tion 7:11, clause 1, of the General Administrative Law Act. The article DTe
refers to states: “If the objection is admissible, the disputed order shall be
reviewed on the basis thereof”.14 From this alone it is not clear whether the
no reformation doctrine—as applied by DTe—was legally necessary. There is
no further evidence that discusses this issue at that moment. The introduction
of no reformatio in peius essentially introduced a zero-loss incentive for the
energy companies. Appealing decisions could only benefit the companies.
5.2 X-Factor 2001: introducing the zero-loss effect
Table 2 reports the X-Factors following the appeal by the distribution compa-
nies. The results for Essent do not change, as they did not appeal the previous
X-Factor decision in 2000. The total revenue reductions for the sector decreased
frome511mln toe376mln (26%). The required revenue reduction for the sec-
tor drops from 25 to 19%. The average X-Factor set by DTe is the same in
2001 as in 2000. The fall in required revenue reduction is explained by the
decrease in revenue base over which the X-Factor is calculated. In 2000 this was
circa e2 bn, whereas in 2001 it was circa e1.8 bn, as certain costs were labeled
non-controllable and excluded from the benchmarking exercise.
14 Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht (Awb). Available at www.justitie.nl
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There are some large shifts in the outcomes. In 2000 Rendo and Westland
were both required to reduce their revenues by 40 and 4%, respectively. How-
ever, in the 2001 X-Factors, Rendo andWestland were allowed to increase their
revenues with 22 and 25%, respectively. Instead of Rendo’s customers receiving
a e96 reduction, they were now faced with a e52 tariff increase. For Westland
there was initially a tariff decrease equivalent to e20 per customer, whereas in
the 2001 appeal decisions customers would face tariff increases equivalent to
e128 per customer.
As a result of the appeal Eneco and Nuon both saw their required revenue
reduction decrease from approximately 40 to approximately 30%. For Eneco
this was equivalent to e58mln and for Nuon equivalent to e53mln in reduced
revenue reductions. The results for Essent do not change because they did not
appeal the 2000 X-Factor decision.
The companies however were still unhappy with the results. The benchmark-
ing exercise and its mechanistic application of the results were a focal point
of their criticisms. The final resort for the companies was to take their case to
the special business tribunal (the CBb). All the companies subsequently lodged
their appeals with the court. During this whole process the X-Factors set in 2000
still applied.
At the same time that the discussions surrounding the X-Factors for net-
work operators were taking place, there were discussions about the X-Factors
for retail tariffs. The articles describing the methodology for setting the retail
tariff X-Factor are exactly the same as for network tariffs. As the retail
X-Factors were less data-intensive (and therefore less time-intensive) the
appeal procedure had run ahead of the X-Factors for networks. One of the
retail companies (Rendo) had already lodged an appeal against its retail tariffs
with theCBb.On 6 February 2002 theCBb ruled thatDTe had not acted accord-
ing to the E-Act’s intentions.15 According to the CBb the E-Act did not allow
DTe to set X-Factors that could vary between individual companies. Instead the
X-Factor had to be uniform for the sector. InArticle 58:1:b the E-Act states that
“xt = the discount factor to stimulate the efficient operation by retail
license holders,….”16
This was a substantial blow for the DTe and the ruling was unexpected by
the sector.17 The sector and DTe had until this point not questioned whether a
distinction needed to bemade between individual or uniformX-Factors. Earlier
objections by the companies did not refer to this issue. This was presumably not
the intention of the original E-Act as it was also based on experiences in other
15 College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (2002a), No AWB 01/623.
16 The originalDutchArticle states: “xt = de korting ter bevordering van de doelmatige bedrijfsvo-
ering door vergunninghouders voor zover het betreft de inkoop van elektriciteit en de diensten
met betrekking tot de levering van elektriciteit.”
17 See for example Knops (2002), De Pree (2002), De Telegraaf (2002), and Het Financiele
Dagblad (2002).
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countries with X-Factors systems, and could partly be blamed on poor drafting,
but also on a very narrow interpretation by the court.
The DTe announced that same month (February 2002) that it was starting
a project called “Correctie Besluiten” (corrected decisions) for the network
operators. It intended to issue a new request for information from the network
companies, allowing them to revise and update data (some data had been esti-
mated as actual figures had not been available at the time of the 2000 and 2001
X-Factor revisions). This dataset would be then be verified by the companies,
before it would be used to re-calculate the X-Factors for the period for a third
time. Both DTe and companies took part in this exercise, attempting to agree
on a final dataset.
During the intermittent period of regulatory uncertainty following the CBb’s
decision, the DTe published An Overview of the First Regulatory Review of the
Regional Electricity Networks Business in July 2002.18 The report contained a
detailed discussion of the role of the regulator and the objectives of DTe. In the
introduction the DTe stated
“In particular DTe is keen to demonstrate that each of the decisions it has
taken during the first regulatory review has been guided by a common set
of underlying principles.” (DTe, 2002, p. 1)
In addition the DTe stated that it “…it would prefer to provide incentives
for the companies to focus their attention on delivering the best services to
customers, rather than debating their costs with the regulator.”19 Importantly,
the DTe explains why it had chosen the DEA benchmarking technique over
the other possible methodologies
“Regression analysis seeks to explain differences in cost on the basis of a
range of factors. In contrast, DEA evaluates whether observed costs can
be regarded as reasonable on the basis of the basket of outputs delivered,
where the regulator selects which outputs are considered valuable. For this
reason alone DTe regards DEA as better suited for use in a regulatory
context.” (DTe, 2002, p. 27)
As will become clear from the next section, the arguments for or against par-
ticular model specifications or methods (such as DEA), were never evaluated
by the courts.
5.3 X-Factor 2002: getting the data right
In August 2002 DTe published newX-Factors. These newX-Factors were based
on the project Correctie Besluiten. Table 3 summarizes the 2002 X-Factors and
total cumulative savings for consumers, it does not include the no “reformatio
18 DTe (2002c), AnOverview of the First Regulatory Review of the Regional Electricity Networks
Business, July 2002, The Hague.
19 DTe (2002c), op. cit. p. 3.
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in peius” for Essent. DTe argued that the X-Factor decisions from the Correctie
Besluiten were not decisions made based on an appeal, but were completely
new decisions, therefore the no reformatio principle did not apply.
Table 3 shows the X-Factors using the “corrected” data and actual 2000 fig-
ures for all the companies. The data used in the 2000 and 2001 X-Factors was
based on estimates and projections of 2000, rather than actual audited data. It
excludes the no reformatio in peius—giving a clean picture of the revenue reduc-
tions using actual audited 2000 data. The revenue reduction for the sector is
similar to the 2001 X-Factors decisions. The X-Factors also look similar, but the
revenue base over which they are calculated has decreased from circa e2 bn in
2000 toe1.5 bn in 2002. The cumulative reduction in revenue is 19%of total rev-
enue, with per customer savings of e53. Given the methodology and approach
used by DTe, these results probably best represent the underlying relative
positions of the various companies. The use of actual audited data perhaps also
allowed amore considered view of themethodology and approach used byDTe.
Judged against the initial X-Factors in 2000, DTe had earlier overestimated
the scope for revenue reductions for the sector (and customers) by 33%. In
addition, the DTe overestimated revenue reductions for certain companies,
whilst underestimating them for others.
Comparing the 2001 and 2002 X-Factors, the required revenue reduction
drops from e146 to e74mln for Eneco and from e217 to e168mln for Nuon.
Eneco Eneco and Eneco REMU are largely responsible for Eneco’s e72mln
decrease. The required revenue reduction for Essent is e147mln. This is sub-
stantiallymore thane26mln as initially estimated byDTe.Rather than allowing
EssentBrabant to increase revenues bye21mln, the 2002 calculations show that
there should be a e39mln revenue reduction. This is a difference of e60mln
(20% of Essent Brabant’s revenue).
The 2002 Correctie Besluiten demonstrates that quality of data is critical in
theX-Factor process. DTe should have waited for this “finalized” dataset before
publishing X-Factors. It can be argued that the DTe elicited the correct infor-
mation by publishing X-Factors based on projections and estimates. However,
DTe could have obtained the same result by publishing public consultation doc-
uments containing the results, and delaying the formal decision-making process,
which in the Dutch case meant that mistakes would filter through into later
revisions based on new audited (and more accurate) data.
However, the 2002 results were never implemented as there remained uncer-
tainty over the legal basis of individual X-Factors. The uncertainty over indi-
vidual versus uniform X-Factors (and the legal basis for DTe’s approach) was
finally removed on 13 November 2002 when the CBb ruled that the relevant
article of the E-Act for setting X-Factors for network operators was to be read
in the same way as the article for retail tariffs.20
20 College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (2002b), No AWB 01/841, 01/847-53, 01/955, 01/956.
This did not come as a surprise to either the sector or DTe. In actual fact DTe had been preparing
for this eventuality during 2002. This is confirmed by the consultation note discussing possible
solutions published 16 January 2003 by DTe (DTe 2002b).
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“xt = the discount factor to stimulate the efficient operation by grid oper-
ators”21
This meant that according to the E-Act DTe only had the legal basis to set a
uniform X-Factor for the sector and not individually varying X-Factors.22
5.4 X-Factor 2003: striking a deal
After the court decision DTe was forced to reconsider the methodology for
setting the X-Factors. In addition, there was a need to get out of the mess and
achieve a break-through in the X-Factor discussion.
On 2 December 2002 the DTe announced that the then head of DTe would
be replaced.23 On 13 December 2002 DTe announced that Gert Zijl would
become head of the DTe per 1 January 2003. Mr Zijl had until then been CEO
of the national transmission system operator (TenneT).24
The new Director’s approach to the deadlock was two-fold. First, in January
2003 DTe published a consultation note setting out DTe’s proposed approach
to repairing the X-Factors.25 In this document DTe suggested a tariff bench-
mark, which would look at actual tariffs rather than at costs and outputs—from
which tariffs would be derived. As a second alternative, DTe suggested a stan-
dardized tariff benchmark – taking into account different weights of different
customer categories. In the document DTe does not discuss the possibility of
one-off tariff reductions (P0 reductions), which would allow uniform X-Factors
to be set. The E-Act does not mention this possibility. Second, DTe initiated
behind-the-scenes negotiations with Eneco, Essent, and Nuon.
After months of negotiating and discussing alternative models, a deal was
finally presented to all the network operators and signed on 26May 2003.26 The
deal covers two regulatory periods, the first from 2001 until 2003 and the second
period from 2004 until 2006. As the final deal would be reached in the final year
of the first period, it was agreed that the second period would be included.
The DTe published the results and followed the public consultation process. All
the companies and their shareholders were required to sign the deal and state
that they would not appeal during this consultation period and subject to the
results of the deal being implemented, would withdraw any remaining appeals
21 The original Dutch Article states: “xt = de korting ter bevordering van de doelmatige bed-
rijfsvoering door netbeheerders.”
22 One of the unfortunate side-effects of the CBb rulings was that the actual X-Factor methodol-
ogy and underlying benchmarking was never tested in a court. Thus, in a sense the legal basis for
DTe’s approach to setting the X-Factors, has never been verified.
23 DTe (2002d), Directeur De Jong stapt over naar Europees platform energietoezichthouders,
press release, 2 December 2002, The Hague.
24 DTe (2002e), Gert Zijl nieuwe directeur DTe, press release, 13 December 2002, The Hague.
25 DTe (2003b), Consultatienotitie: Reparatie X-Factor Netbeheerders Elektriciteit, Visie DTe,
The Hague, 16 January 2003.
26 A similar deal was signed in November 2003 with the gas network operators after several
months of intense discussions.
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against DTe. For the first regulatory period there was a uniform X-Factor of
3.2% over total revenue (and thus tariffs), as legally required according to the
original E-Act. For the second regulatory period however there are individual
X-Factors. These individual X-Factors were set so that all companies converge
to the efficient level by 31 December 2006, thus achieving a major target of
DTe. The amendments to the E-Act—to allow for this—were not yet in place
at the time of the deal.
During these negotiations theMinister for EconomicAffairs prepared emer-
gency legislation to repair the uniform versus individual X-Factor text in the
current E-Act. A first draft of this legislation was first published on 10 April
2003 (Overgangswet Elektriciteitsproductiesector27). This repair would allow
the DTe to set individual X-Factors and importantly also do this retrospectively
(and backdate the X-Factors), allowing DTe to effectively re-take its decisions
and ignore the CBb ruling. The final bill was enacted on 19 August 2003, only
after—among other things—the Minister promised the Upper Chamber not to
make use of the retrospectivity of the Act. In the final version, the amended
E-Act states in Article 41a:1:a
“With regard to the proposal, as mentioned in Article 41:b, the director of
DTe sets for each individual grid operator, for a period of 3–5 years, the
following
a. the discount factor to stimulate efficient operation…”28
Note that the Act clearly states that “the discount factor” is set for “each
individual grid operator”.
In the new methodology, the performance of each company is compared to
the total weighted output factor that incorporates all different tariff levels and
types of customer. For example, it weights low voltage customers differently
than high voltage customers. This allows each company to have a “uniform” bill
for the services it provides. This is then benchmarked against the standardized
costs of the company; the company that provides most value-for-money is set as
the reference company. In essence the method is a weighted tariff benchmark
against the sector average tariffs. This methodology takes into account all the
different types of customers (rather than only small and large customers in the
DEA) and the actual tariffs for the services provided. The major drawback of
this approach is that it focuses on average performance rather than best-practice
performance.
In Table 4 the X-Factors and revenue reductions that were reported in the
deal in 2003 are shown. In the 2003 deal all the subsidiaries are merged into the
27 The abbreviation for this Act, which repairs a substantial amount of previous legislation, is
ironically “Oeps”!
28 The original dutch Article states: “Ten behoeve van het voorstel, bedoeld in artikel 41b, stelt
de directeur van de dienst voor iedere netbeheerder afzonderlijk voor een periode van ten minste
drie en ten hoogste vijf jaar vast:
a. de korting ter bevordering van de doelmatige bedrijfsvoering.”
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holding company—with one X-Factor set across the whole company. The total
revenue reduction for the sector is e349mln or 17% of the actual revenue. The
individual X-Factors are all set equal at 3.2%—in line with the requirements
of the E-Act. Although the deal is substantially less than the initial X-Factor in
2000 (33% compared to 2000), it does not differ substantially from the X-Fac-
tors in 2002—where the most accurate data was used. The difference between
the 2002 and 2003 results is only e35mln (10% decrease). However, there are
some substantial shifts between the companies.
Therequiredrevenuereductionfromthe2003dealforEnecoise10mlnhigher
than the 2002 calculations. Nuon’s revenue reduction ise54mln lower than cal-
culated by DTe in 2002. Essent’s revenue reduction is lower than in the 2002
calculations, but still substantially above the 2000and2001 revisions.Delta’s rev-
enue increase of e10mln changes into a revenue reduction of e11mln. NRE,
ONS,Essent andNuon gainede74mlnmoving from2002 to 2003. Cogas,Delta,
Rendo andWestland had total revenue reductions ofe39mln.
5.5 Final X-Factor 2003: chains from the past
However, DTe promised to apply the no reformatio in peius principle in the
deal. This was necessary to reach agreement with the sector, as some compa-
nies had profited from lower X-Factors. DTe had also introduced this concept
in the first place. In practice this meant that if companies were still owed money
they were allowed to recover this through their tariffs, whereas those that had
earned too much were not required to reimburse customers.29 Though the total
sector revenue reduction is not dissimilar from the 2002 X-Factor result, the
impact of no reformatio in peius was substantial—but it was not reported in
the deal documentation. We therefore adjust Table 4 by reporting the revenue
stream that is most beneficial to the companies—comparing the 2003 outcome
with the 2001 X-Factors (these were the last official X-factors as the 2002 results
were never implemented). If the total required revenue reductions were greater
in 2003 than in 2001, we present the 2001 revenue reduction. This way we factor
in the no reformatio.
In Table 5 the X-Factors and revenue reductions that were set as a result of
the deal in 2003—including no reformatio in peius—are shown. The total reve-
nue reduction for the sector is e209mln or 10% of the actual revenue. Essent
benefits most from the initial errors that were made in 2000/1.
It can be seen that the adjustment for no reformatio in peius leads to a
substantial decrease in revenue reductions, from e349mln to e209mln (67%
reduction). In absolute terms Essent benefits most from the ruling. Instead of
seeing its revenue decrease by e128mln (17% of actual revenue), it is only
required to reduce it by e26mln (3% of actual revenue). The total cost of the
no reformatio in peius is e140mln of which e102mln is directly attributable to
29 However, from 1 January 2004 all companies will start from the adjusted starting point taking
the full 3.2% X-Factor into consideration.
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Essent.When compared with 2002, the total cost ise175mln of whiche120mln
is directly attributable to Essent. The other beneficiaries are Delta (+e11mln
instead of −e11mln) and Westland (+e6mln instead of −e4mln).
5.6 Summary
The X-Factors and required revenue reductions have changed substantially
during the first regulatory period. Three “stories” emerge.
The first story involves DTe getting the numbers right. This involves the
period 2000–2002. The results that were presented following the clean-up ses-
sion provide the most accurate picture of the relative positions and possible
tariff reductions. Thus, the DTe overstated the potential cost savings in 2000 by
33%. In 2000 it was suggested that customers were to see a cumulative reduction
in their bills of around e70. Instead the revised figure based on actual audited
data in 2002 was e53.
The second story involves DTe striking a deal following the court defeat
in November 2002. The results from the new methodology used in the 2003
deal did not differ substantially from the 2002 X-Factors. The deal suggested
cost savings equivalent to 17% of actual revenue (the 2002 X-factors at 19%).
Although the savings for the sector as a whole were similar, the distribution
of cost reductions between companies altered substantially. The losers from
this process were the shareholders of Eneco and Delta, who were required to
reduce their revenues by an additionale10 ande22mln, respectively (although
this was not implemented as shown later). The gainers were the shareholders
of Essent and Nuon, who saw their revenue reduction decreased by e19 and
e54mln, respectively.
The final story involves the dealing with past mistakes. As part of the deal
DTe was required to uphold those results from 2001 that were most advanta-
geous for the companies. This resulted in the actual tariff reductions only being
e209mln—or 10% of actual revenue. Although on paper customers stood to
gain e48, the result of mistakes made in 2000/1 meant they would only receive
e29. The total cost of the no reformatio in peius is e140mln of which e102mln
is attributable to Essent (Table 6).
Table 7 shows the effect of the different stages in the revision of the X-Fac-
tors. It shows that at each “stage”DTe had to reduce the cumulative cost savings
for the total sector. From e70 per customer initially, to e29 at the end of the
deal including the no reformatio.
6 The experience in context: conclusions and lessons
The outcome of theDutch price review process has been disappointing. In terms
of the length of overrun in the process (first X-Factor set in summer of 2000,
but final X-Factors agreed in May 2003) and in the unmet initial expectations
it compares unfavorably to other price reviews that regularly take place in for
example the UK, Norway, Australia, and Chile. Although initially promised
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Table 7 Summary of revenue changes per customer per company
Cumulative reduction per customer (e) Eneco Essent Nuon Others Total
Initital estimate 114 11 101 24 70
Story 1: Initial miscalculation −73 51 −38 −32 −17
Story 2: The deal 5 −8 −20 61 −5
Story 3: Reformatio 0 −43 0 −84 −19
Total effect −68 −0 −59 −55 −42
End result 46 11 43 −31 29
savings of e511mln only e384mln of those savings turned out to be accurate.
The subsequent court case defeats and previous allowance of the no reformatio
in peiusmeant that onlye209mln of thee384mlnwas achieved. The regulatory
failure in The Netherlands was caused by a number of factors.
First, although the regulator and companies understood that the intention of
the original Act was to set individual X-Factors, the litigation which the process
gave rise to exposed the loose drafting to legal scrutiny.
Second, the timing of the process meant that during the first X-Factor setting
in the summer of 2000 there was only budgeted data available for 2000—as
opposed to actual audited data. DTe was forced to use data estimates to calcu-
late legally binding X-Factors. It could however have introduced the possibility
to revise X-Factors once the actual audited data became available, or as in the
UK used previous year’s data. The publication of preliminary results therefore
gave the companies the incentive to release more accurate data. However, the
legal requirement to publish a formal price control review meant that the like-
lihood that mistakes would influence the results was large. Together with the
chosen methodology and application of the results (see point three) meant that
large fluctuations in X-Factors would be possible.
Third, the mistakes that were made in the first round of X-Factors in 2000
influenced the final deal with the sector in 2003. This was partially the result
of the application of the no reformatio in peius principle, which essentially
allowed companies to retain favorable, though potentially erroneous X-Factors
and introduced a zero-loss game for the companies. As part of the deal DTe
was required to allow those network operators that should have received more
favorable X-Factors to compensate for this in their tariffs. The one-sided appli-
cation allowing positive benefits from mistakes to be kept (no reformatio)
and negative results to be compensated has come at a substantial cost for the
Dutch consumer (see the results for Essent). The total 2003 deal includes indi-
vidual X-Factors for the second period that force companies back to a single
“end-point” and thus compensate for these “costs”. However, the mistakes
from the first period have delayed overall tariff reductions for customers and
the distribution of the reductions from these mistakes has not been in line
with the distribution of reductions as suggested when using actual audited data
(as in 2002).
In the UK, the Competition Commission looks at each case afresh and is
not constrained by previous decisions of either the sector regulator or itself.
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For example, mobile phone operators have seen that the Commission does not
hesitate to impose stricter price caps than suggested by the sector regulator
Ofcom (Competition Commission, 2003). DTe’s approach also hampers the
higher appeal authority to correct potentially erroneous results that are not
in the interest of consumers. The DTe’s approach meant there was no risk to
appealing decisions—thus encouraging companies to keep appealing as there
was only an upside. DTe also only changed results for those companies involved
in the appeal—although methodologically it included all the companies (e.g.
Essent). DTe has indicated that in future it does not intend to apply the no ref-
ormatio principle any longer. Interestingly, the 2003 deal contains a passage that
states that if—after signing the deal—DTe changes an element of the results for
one party (favorably) it should do so for all other companies as well.
Rather than having a court rule on whether the law has been applied and
that there has been “ due process”, it would be better if the appeal authority
(in this case the competition authorities in The Netherlands) would have the
possibility to overturn decisions. This would incentivize both the regulator and
the companies to try to reach an agreement on X-Factors.
Fourth, although DTe announced the use of different benchmarking tech-
niques to derive the X-Factors (DEA and SFA), they only used DEA and one
model specification for the final determination. The results were subsequently
mechanically applied to the cost structures without considering potential errors
in the data that could distort the efficiency scores. The one-to-one transla-
tion using inaccurate data accentuated the X-Factors and results, as can be
seen by the different outcomes between 2000 and 2002. It is difficult to sepa-
rate out the different effects between 2000 and 2002 that can be attributed to
data errors, model specification, and approach (e.g. determination of revenue
base for benchmarking). There was no attempt to apply the results pragmati-
cally as has been done in the UK (see Pollitt, 2005). The model specification
also differed from models used elsewhere by regulators.30 A more balanced
approach whereby the benchmarking results were based on several techniques
would have potentiallymade the resultsmore acceptable, because (a) the results
are less vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies of each method giving a more balanced
(less extreme) picture, (b) the weighting of the different approaches allows
DTe some discretion to incorporate specific company-related factors, and (c)
consistency across different models makes results more acceptable to those
companies involved. Most companies are more interested in the outcome than
whether a methodology is balanced. However, DTe would have had a more
credible case to defend.
Finally, the Netherlands case illustrates the importance of an informed dia-
logue between the regulator and the companies about the progress of the reg-
ulatory review, especially when a new regulatory regime is being implemented
for the first time. Once committed to the timetable the DTe failed to discuss
the process sufficiently with the companies and to follow up its initial approach
30 See Nillesen and Telling (2001) op. cit.
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in the July 1999 document (multiple methods, cross-checking of results, no
one-to-one translation). The result was a loss of confidence in the process at an
early stage by many of the companies and a litigious approach to any decision
taken by DTe.
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